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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS CONVERGING OR 
DIVERGING TRENDS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT? 
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ABSTRACT 
The utilization of the public-private partnership (PPP) model as a means of delivering 
various types of asset-based public services and infrastructure is often seen in academic 
research as part of a globally spread public management reform trend. This view is 
often suggested with reference to the staggering amount of attention and public money, 
which is now being dedicated to the formation of PPPs worldwide. This article, howev-
er, proceeds from the observation that if we look beyond the reports from a small hand-
ful of primarily Anglo-Saxon countries, which have so far attracted widespread atten-
tion in the PPP literature, we observe a much more divergent and heterogeneous pat-
tern in various national governments’ policy and regulation for PPP and the amount of 
actually implemented PPP projects. By comparing the initiatives taken by the Irish gov-
ernment, which has embraced PPPs, with those of the Danish government, which has 
been PPP sceptic, the article draws on two in-depth country case studies to examine 
how and why PPPs developed so differently in the two countries. The research illus-
trates that whereas PPPs in Denmark have been subject to a loosely organized institu-
tional framework with a number of fundamental policy and regulation issues being ei-
ther unresolved or not very supportive to the uptake of PPPs, Ireland, on the other 
hand, now presides over one of the most ambitious PPP programs in the world, with 
major policy, regulation and procurement functions centralized within the Ministry of 
Finance and the Treasury. As research on PPPs continues to proliferate, this article 
illustrates that academic PPP literature would benefit from adopting a more explicit 
comparative focus to account for these significant comparative differences in national 
governments’ PPP approaches. 
Keywords – Denmark, Ireland, multiple streams, policy, public-private partnerships, 
regulation 
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INTRODUCTION 
The term partnership is now a dominant slogan in the rhetoric of public sector reform, 
arguably capturing that status from privatization which held similar dominance through 
the 1980s and 1990s. (Wettenhall, 2003: 77). 
 
Public-private partnerships, especially in the area of infrastructure development, now 
represent a relatively new but increasingly ubiquitous organizational arrangement with 
international acceptance. (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007: 570). 
 
Its advocates tout it as the epitome of a new generation of management reforms, espe-
cially suited to the contemporary economic and political imperatives for efficiency and 
quality. (Linder, 1999: 35). 
 
Provision of new investment in infrastructure in Europe is increasingly being carried out 
under a range of PPP structures based on the principle of private sector risk taking par-
ticipation in the provision of public infrastructure. (European Investment Bank, 2004: 
3). 
 
Every now and then a new and fashionable public management reform concept captures 
the attention of public administration scholars and policy practitioners alike. When this 
coincides with a political milieu which is favourable to policy change, it occasionally 
sets the agenda for widespread public sector reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Bar-
zelay and Shvets, 2006). While the New Public Management (NPM) was certainly such 
a concept (Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000), so is arguably also the notion of public-private 
partnership (PPP), which now enjoys widespread acclaim in modern public administra-
tion (Linder, 1999; Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005; Ysa, 2007; Hodge and 
Greve, 2007). Based on the idea of collaboration and joint decision-making, the partner-
ship idea has been seen as representative of a new generation of new public governance 
“overcoming the deficits of the earlier waves of privatization and marketization” 
(Hammerschmid and Angerer, 2005; see also Osborne, 2010). Hence, as argued by 
Teisman and Klijn (2002: 198), “Partnerships are seen as the best way, in the end, to 
govern the complex relations and interactions in a modern network society”. 
 
The concept of PPP has been defined in numerous ways, from loose (and somewhat 
vague) conceptualizations including almost any form of public-private interaction to the 
most narrow definitions of PPPs as contract based relationships specifying in detail the 
responsibilities and obligations of the respective partners (Linder, 1999; Wettenhall, 
2003; Weihe, 2005). Perhaps the biggest difference in the literature is found between 
scholars who view PPP as a “language game” (Linder, 1999; Hodge and Greve, 2005), 
and those who think of it as a cooperative institutional arrangement involving shared 
risks, costs, responsibilities, resources and benefits over a long time period (Van Ham 
and Koppenjan, 2002; Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005). Within the institu-
tional perspective on PPP, a further distinction has been drawn between partnerships 
involving loose organizational relationships, as found in issue networks and policy 
communities, and PPPs characterized by tight financial and organizational relationships, 
as represented by various PPP/PFI (Private Finance Initiative) type arrangements (Flin-
ders, 2005; Hodge and Greve, 2005). In the latter meaning, a public authority contracts 
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with a private company – a so-called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) – for various com-
binations of planning, procurement, construction, finance and operation of a major con-
struction or infrastructure facility1. These long-term commercial PPP contracts for asset-
based public services and infrastructure development are the exclusive focus of this arti-
cle (Bloomfield, 2006). 
 
The scholarly literature on PPPs has been rapidly developing over the past ten to fifteen 
years with significant inputs from numerous disciplines, including public administration 
(Koppenjan, 2005), public management (Ysa, 2007), construction management (Koch 
and Buser, 2006), legal studies (Tvarnø, 2006) and accounting (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2002), just to mention a few. A large practice-oriented literature has also emerged, with 
significant inputs from private consultancy firms (e.g. Allen Consulting Group, 2007; 
Babcock and Brown, 2008), national PPP units (Irish Central PPP Unit, 2001; Danish 
Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2004; HM Treasury, 2006), institutions of the 
EU (European Commission, 2004; EIB, 2005), and international organizations (World 
Bank, 2006; IMF, 2006; OECD, 2008). This literature, with a predominance of Anglo-
Saxon contributions (Hammerschmidt and Angerer, 2005), has to a large extent re-
hearsed the idea of PPP as a globally spread reform trend in public administration (e.g., 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Ghobadian et al., 2004; Kwak, Chih, Ibbs, 2009). Indeed, the 
opening quotations describing PPPs as “a very-fashionable concept” (Wettenhal, 2003: 
77), which “enjoys remarkable acclaim” (Linder, 1999: 35), and “with international 
acceptance” (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007:570), might perhaps lead us to assume simi-
larity and convergence in PPP initiatives across countries. 
 
More recently, however, scholars writing from a central-European and Scandinavian 
public administration tradition have increasingly noted that PPP reform initiatives have 
not been the same everywhere (cf. Greve and Hodge, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos and 
Hughes, 2007; Petersen, 2010a). In some cases, governments have enacted comprehen-
sive PPP policies and regulations and signed a substantial number of major schemes 
over the course of the last ten to fifteen years. This group, with an Anglo-Saxon and 
South-European predominance, includes the UK, Australia, Canada, Portugal, Spain 
and, more recently, also Ireland (Irish Ministry of Finance, 2009). A second group has 
also developed relatively comprehensive policy and regulation frameworks to guide and 
steer PPP activity, but signed a smaller number of actual PPP projects. These countries 
include France, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Poland (Babcock and 
Brown, 2008). Finally, some countries have reacted to the PPP concept with much skep-
ticism and formed few or no concrete PPP projects. These include Denmark and the rest 
of Scandinavia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and some of the new European Union 
(EU) member states. Thus, in reality, if we look beyond the testimonies from a small 
handful of countries that often display in the literature, we might say that national gov-
ernments’ reform initiatives for PPPs are in fact a highly divergent phenomenon across 
various national institutional settings. 
  
In this article, I attempt to make a contribution to the understanding of these vast differ-
ences in national modes adopting the PPP reform trend, with a focus on Danish and 
Irish PPP experiences. The importance of studying PPPs in a comparative way arises 
both from an interest in understanding their similarities and differences and from an 
interest in the fundamental question as to why governments resort to PPPs in the first 
place (Hodge and Greve, 2005). The article’s explanandum is authoritative decisions 
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about policy and regulation for PPP made by government departments and agencies 
entrusted with the formal authority to formulate and oversee the national regime for 
PPPs. The focus is on system-wide decisions, i.e. decisions that are relevant for the 
whole or for most of the regime, as opposed to regulations and processes found within a 
single department or agency (see also Barzelay and Shvets, 2006). Public administration 
scholarship has recently taken seminal steps towards developing comparative approach-
es to the study of public policy and public management reform (Barzelay, 2001; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg, 
2007). A significant contribution to this endeavor has been made by Michael Barzelay 
and associates (e.g. Barzelay, 2001; Barzelay et al, 2003; Gaetani, 2003) under the pre-
scription of ‘Institutional Processualism’, for the research program’s focus on policy 
processes and institutions in the study of public policy-making (Barzelay and Gallego, 
2006). 
 
In this article, I utilize this comparative research combined with Kingdon’s (1995) mul-
tiple streams framework to study PPP policy and regulation in a comparative way.2 The 
article addresses the following research questions: How did PPP policies and regula-
tions develop, and how did they come to differ so significantly across countries which 
are similar in a number of other dimensions? These questions are examined in a com-
parative case study of the development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and 
Ireland over a ten-year period from 1999 to 2009. The empirical material utilized in the 
article has been drawn from a number of sources, including in-depth expert interviews 
with key organizational representatives (both public and private), a large amount of 
written material stored in a database, and Eurostat archive data containing key economic 
figures for the two countries (see Appendixes 1-3). 
 
The comparative interest in Denmark and Ireland is sparked by their display of similari-
ty on a number of dimensions, while the two cases differ on the outcome variable of 
PPP policies and regulations. Both countries are small open economies with a popula-
tion of respectively 5.5 and 4.3 million inhabitants, and both are members of the EU, 
which makes them subject to a common set of regulations in relation to public procure-
ment and on/off-balance sheet accounting and risk principles of risk sharing in PPPs 
(Eurostat, 2004; see also Petersen, 2010b). Moreover, both countries were late adopters 
of broader privatization measures, and they both officially launched PPPs in 1999. 
However, whereas Ireland has embraced PPPs and developed a comprehensive policy 
and regulation framework to support the implementation of PPP schemes across a broad 
range of procurement sectors, Denmark has been a skeptic and has only reluctantly de-
veloped policy and regulation in this area (Petersen, 2009). As a result of this, Ireland 
now counts around 70 major PPP schemes in various phases of planning and operation, 
thereby making the Irish PPP program one of the most ambitious in the world when 
taking size into consideration (compare with the UK’s 59 million inhabitants). In Den-
mark, on the contrary, PPP policy and regulation have developed slowly and there are 
just five PPP schemes in the country to show for it and a few are being planned (Pe-
tersen and Vrangbæk, 2010). By analyzing Danish and Irish PPP cases comparatively, 
the article reveals two highly contrasting national accounts of PPP government-wide 
PPP policies and regulations, which I argue could form an inspiration point for future, 
much needed comparative PPP research. 
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The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical framework, drawing on 
Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams model to study public policy-making. Method and 
research design is then presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present case studies into 
how PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland, respectively, developed over 
the ten year period from 1999-2009. These insights are, in Section 6, analyzed through 
the lens of the multiple streams model to explain the differences between Denmark and 
Ireland’s PPP policies and regulation. Finally, in Section 7, a conclusion to the article is 
provided. 
 ANALYSING PPP POLICY AND REGULATION: A MULTIPLE STREAMS  
MODEL OF PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING 
The need to look at the policy and regulation aspects of PPPs has been identified by 
several scholars, such as Klijn and Teisman (2003), Ysa (2007) and Greve and Hodge 
(2010). However, most studies have hitherto been preoccupied with the performance of 
PPPs (e.g. Pollitt, 2005; Pollock and Price, 2008), technical/legal aspects (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2002; Bing et al., 2005; Tvarnø, 2006), and conceptual/historical discussions 
(Linder, 1999; Wettenhall, 2003; Weihe, 2005), but have generally been less attentive to 
broader policy and regulation issues of PPPs (although see Klijn and Teisman, 2003; 
Flinders, 2005). Furthermore, studies dealing with policy and regulation issues of PPPs 
have typically operated with single country research designs (cf. Spackman, 2002; 
Reeves, 2003; Deakin, 2002; Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Flinders, 2005; Koppenjan, 
2005; Johnston and Gudergan, 2007), whereas comparative approaches are generally 
rare in this field of research (although for a few notable exceptions; see Greve and 
Hodge, 2007; McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010). 
 
We know from the comparative public administration literature on NPM and post-NPM 
that we should not expect a global convergence on a common and uniform reform idea 
or concept (cf. Barzelay, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Barzelay and Gallego, 
2006; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). This literature sees public sector reforms as 
shaped by a complex mix of national policy features, environmental pressures and his-
torical and institutional context (Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg, 2007). Other attempts at 
analyzing and classifying public sector developments at national level include distinct 
welfare state approaches (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or differing models of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). In a more practice-oriented way, the OECD’s PUMA project 
and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators can also be seen as attempts to categorize 
and compare public sector developments at the national level. These macro-approaches, 
however, have been contested for presenting oversimplified and static pictures, while 
paying too little attention to the actors, interests and policy processes in which specific 
national trajectories of public policy-making and regulation are formed and implement-
ed (Deakin, 2002). 
 
In order to understand how and why PPP policy and regulation developed – and thus 
account for their similarities and differences in Denmark and Ireland – I will argue that 
we need to examine how PPPs were raised on the decision agendas of various policy 
actors and inspect how concrete decisions about PPP policy and regulation were taken 
in the two countries. Towards this endeavor, I draw on John Kingdon’s multiple streams 
model (1995), a political science model of public policy making, which is supplemented 
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by Michael Barzelay’s event-centered approach to public management policy-change 
(Barzelay et al., 2003). Kingdon’s model was originally developed to understand the 
process of agenda-setting and seeking alternatives, and a number of scholars have sub-
sequently argued that this model can also be utilized for analysis of the decision-making 
phase in policy-making (Zahariades, 1999; Barzelay and Gallego, 2006; Bundgaard and 
Vrangbæk, 2007). The model focuses on how the process is organized, and the implica-
tions of this for opening ‘policy-windows’ at particular points in time. It also focuses on 
the role of bounded rational policy entrepreneurs, although it has been criticized for not 
always being clear about their roles within the respective process streams (Sabatier, 
1999: 5; Bundgaard and Vrangbæk, 2007). 
 
Kingdon’s model, with its focus on the flow and timing of policy decisions, is useful for 
examining the complexities of public policy-making and regulation. Drawing on the 
garbage can model of organizational behavior (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972), it basi-
cally conceives policy making as characterized by ambiguity and bounded rationality 
(Zahariadis, 1999). By this token it offers a model of the policy process that is signifi-
cantly more complex and less neat than the classic stages model of policy-making 
(Lasswell, 1956; DeLeon, 1999). The multiple streams model emphasizes the im-
portance of three separate and distinct streams: a problem stream, a policy stream and a 
politics stream. 
 
The problem stream is where a given situation is identified and formulated as a problem 
or issue that calls for political attention. A crisis or unforeseen event may arise; indica-
tors might change, thus calling for changes in policies; or feedback from existing pro-
grams may indicate that action is needed (Kingdon, 1995:ch. 5). The perception of a 
situation as unwanted and within human capacity to control or change it is therefore a 
prerequisite for it to rise on the agenda. But rather than being a rational process, in 
which various issues are analyzed and listed according to objective criteria, the problem 
stream is characterized by an ongoing battle between various issues which cause it to 
capture the attention of people around the policy-making process (Zahariadis, 1999). 
 
The policy stream is where ideas and alternatives float around, waiting to be turned into 
policy alternatives and proposals. Kingdon also refers to this second stream as the poli-
cy primeval soup (1995: 116), referring to the time before life when molecules floated 
around with an infinite number of combinations possible. Ideas are often developed and 
combined by experts and specialists in policy communities, whereas at other times ideas 
which are unrelated to these expert communities come to the fore. To be taken as seri-
ous alternatives, ideas must be technically feasible, but the logic is not necessarily ra-
tional in a narrow instrumental sense. Policy proposals are not necessarily built to re-
solve predefined problems; rather, the logic is quite the opposite. These proposals float 
around searching for problems in the problem stream to which they can be tied, and if 
such a coupling is successful, the chances that this issue will arise in prominence on the 
decision agenda are enhanced (Bundgaard and Vrangbæk, 2007). 
 
The political stream comes third in the model, and although it operates separately from 
the other two streams, political events in this stream can reshuffle the environment in 
which problems and policies battle for attention. Examples of political events are 
swings of national moods, political turnover of governments or parliaments, and interest 
group pressure, all of which can cause certain issues and policies to rise or fall on the 
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decision agenda (Kingdon, 1995). Bargaining over alternatives rather than persuasion 
characterizes the political stream, and more attention is directed at obtaining winning 
coalitions than to assessment of the specific consequences of certain alternatives and 
policies. Thus, bounded rationality is also a precondition in this stream (Brunner, 2008). 
 
As previously mentioned, the three streams are separate and distinct with their own 
logics, dynamics and dominant actors. But occasionally, the three streams meet and a 
problem is linked with a feasible solution that is salient in the political environment 
(Zahariadis, 2003). When this coupling takes place, it increases the likelihood of an is-
sue rising on the decision agenda and turning into a decision – a policy, that is. For ex-
ample, supporters of a given PPP policy may use a political context that is prone to 
market-based solutions in the public sector, while claiming that they present a solution 
to an existing problem of financing essential infrastructure development. If such a cou-
pling is successful, a policy window opens, which makes a decision feasible (Kingdon, 
1995; Travis and Zahariadis, 2002). However, policy-windows can be unforeseeable, 
and they can close again without any decisions being taken if policy-entrepreneurs are 
not successful in coupling the problem to a feasible solution that can be supported by 
the political environment. This makes the policy process inherently ambiguous and de-
pendent upon the temporal coupling of the three process streams (Zahariadis, 1999). 
 
The notion of three separate streams that each work on their own terms provides a use-
ful framework for conducting analysis of the development of PPP policy and regulation, 
because it stresses that in order to foster policy-change, policy-entrepreneurs must cou-
ple a problem with a policy-solution, but also invoke support for the idea within the 
broader political stream. It should be kept in mind, though, that Kingdon’s model was 
originally developed to explain major policy change within a North-American two-party 
system with changing majority rule of a single party, whereas policy-making in Den-
mark and Ireland is characterized by shifting coalition governments, which may render 
policy-change more incremental here than in the US system. Several scholars have illus-
trated the usefulness of the multiple streams model for a European context (cf. Zahari-
adis and Allen, 1995; Zahariades, 2003; Bundgaard and Vrangbæk, 2007; Brunner, 
2008), and for the analysis of more incremental policy-change as well (Travis and 
Zahariades, 2002). The general points about attention as a limited resource and the tem-
porality/timing as key features of policy-change thus seem relevant in a European set-
ting too, although in the present cases I would expect a more incremental policy-change 
than the “irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and our society, pushing 
aside everything that might stand in its path”, which was originally envisaged by King-
don (1995:1). In the section below, I discuss how I use Barzelay’s event centered ap-
proach as a structuring device for keeping track of events and contextual factors that can 
influence the three process streams (Barzelay et al., 2003). 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Creation of a proper data set on ten years of development of PPP policy and regulation 
in two countries required triangulation of data from a number of sources (Peters, 1998). 
First, primary documents were collected for all years in the period from 1999-2009. For 
the relatively simple two-country comparative setup of this very article, this exercise 
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involved the collection and reading of around 140 documents including policy state-
ments, guideline material, legislation, government reports, legal framework contracts, 
etc. (see appendix 2 and 3 for an overview of the sources). In order to organize the ma-
terial, all documents were stored in a database according to type of document, responsi-
ble authority and date of publication. The primary documents were used to establish a 
detailed picture of the central policy initiatives and regulations enacted for PPPs in 
Denmark and Ireland, respectively, and furthermore provided for a first, and rather 
rough, interpretation of the processes whereby PPP policy and regulation developed in 
the two countries. 
 
Next, to establish a detailed account of the policy processes, sequences of events, nego-
tiations, and conflicts, several rounds of expert interviews were held3. In Ireland, face-
to-face interviews were carried out in Dublin with the Central PPP Unit under the Min-
istry of Finance, the National Roads Authority, the National Development Finance 
Agency, and the Department of Education and Science in Tullamore. To supplement 
these official accounts, further interviews were conducted with the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions and the Irish Business Confederation, in Dublin, and with the consultancy 
firm Ernst and Young, in Belfast. A parallel round of interviews was held in Copenha-
gen with the Danish government’s PPP Competence Unit, the Tax Agency, the Ministry 
for Transport, and the Ministry of Finance. Here also, supplementary sources were in-
terviewed, including Local Government Denmark, the Confederation of Danish Indus-
try, the Danish Chamber of Commerce, the Danish Construction Association, and the 
Danish Transport and Logistics Association. All interviews were held face-to-face, and 
were taped to allow further coding and interpretation. Finally, in addition to primary 
documents and expert interviews, statistical measures of government fiscal key aggre-
gates were sampled in order to establish an understanding of the economic background 
settings for introducing PPP policies in the two countries. For this purpose, the Statisti-
cal Office of the European Community (Eurostat) was sourced for comparative statistics 
on government key fiscal indicators (see appendix 1)4. 
 
In the subsequent process of data analysis, the interviews were used to fine-tune the 
initial interpretations established from the primary documents. In order to structure the 
case evidence in a systematic fashion, in this article I draw on a specific conceptual 
framework and methodological guide for event-centered case study research developed 
by Michael Barzelay et al. (2003), which is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Barzelay’s heuristic for ordering case material 
 
 
Source: Barzelay et al. (2003:25). 
The primary object of analysis is denominated as the episode. The current article con-
tains two episodes, which are the development of policy and regulation in Denmark and 
Ireland, respectively, in the period from 1999-2009. Each episode is constituted by a 
number of events, that is, specific decisions about policy and regulation for PPPs. Fur-
thermore, to contextualize and explain the episode, the concepts of prior events and 
contemporaneous events are introduced. Prior events occur before the primary object of 
study, the episode, and provide the background settings for studying the episode. Politi-
co-economic background settings are for example prior events that condition the epi-
sode. Contemporaneous events occur in the same time setting as the episode, and are 
events that are not part of the episode but influence the events constituting the episode. 
Change in the political elite is an example of a contemporaneous event. Jointly, prior 
and contemporaneous events are sources of explanation for the episode (Barzelay et al., 
2003), and they are used to provide theory-based explanations of Denmark and Ireland’s 
developments of PPP policy and regulation. Further, related events occur in the same 
time frame as the episode, but are more affected by the episode than vice-versa. Con-
crete PPP projects, as signed by various national, regional or local public authorities, are 
examples of such related events. Finally, later events designate events that happen after 
the episode, which means that including the later events is merely relevant in the study 
of historic episodes, as noted by Barzelay et al.: “Later events are sometimes included 
in the study frame for purposes of exploring the contemporary relevance of historical 
episodes” (2003: 24 [italic in original]). Hence, in this article, where my focus is on 
explaining differences and similarities in the development of PPP policy and regulation 
with a focus on the present episode, the consequence is that I pay less attention to the 
later and related events in Barzelay’s model (see also Figure 2 and 3 below). 
 
To sum up, in this article I utilize Barzelay’s heuristic as a structuring device, which is 
useful for keeping track of contextual factors that can influence the policy development. 
This is combined with Kingdon’s framework for the analysis of agenda-setting, alterna-
tive seeking and policy-making. The specific method of the article is thus to analyze 
episodes (a series of policy decisions about PPPs within the time frame of the study) as 
a consequence of the successful temporal coupling by policy-entrepreneurs of the prob-
lem, policy and politics streams. In the following, I first outline the two case studies 
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utilizing Barzelay’s event-centered method. This provides a detailed overview of the 
episodes, contemporaneous and prior events in the two cases. Next, I apply Kingdon’s 
multiple streams model to examine the coupling of the streams and the role of policy-
entrepreneurs in the development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland 
in the period from 1999-2009. 
CASE 1: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DENMARK’S PPP POLICY AND 
REGULATION 
The Episode 
The concept of PPPs was launched in Denmark in 1999 by the social-democratic gov-
ernment headed by then Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Danish Ministry of 
Finance, 1999). In the subsequent five years, from 1999-2004, a few government re-
ports mentioned PPP as a means with which to invest in large-scale physical infrastruc-
ture projects (Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, 2002, 2003), but no 
concrete policies or regulations were formulated, and no money was earmarked for pro-
jects. Then, in January 2004, the Danish government launched its Action Plan for Pub-
lic-Private Partnerships listing ten concrete initiatives to support PPPs in Denmark 
(Danish Government, 2004). Among these initiatives were a universal PPP testing re-
quirement, the establishment of a PPP Competence Unit under the Ministry of Econom-
ic and Business Affairs and the launch of seven PPP pilot projects. The PPP Action Plan 
also included amendments to the state building legislation requiring that all construction 
projects above a threshold limit of app. €13 million be tested for PPP relevance. Fur-
thermore, the local government sector was given financial support for the testing of PPP 
projects, and a special pool of money was set up to relieve local municipalities from a 
complicated set of budget restrictions on construction type projects (Danish Govern-
ment, 2004). 
 
The government’s Action Plan for PPP thus encompassed a broad span and introduced a 
number of new initiatives, legislation and a dedicated PPP institution. But in reality the 
government was in fact ambivalent towards PPPs and, in a number of important aspects, 
overtly skeptical that PPP would in fact deliver value for money. To see how this was 
the case, we need only to scratch slightly at the surface of the policy rhetoric of the gov-
ernment’s PPP Action Plan. The effect of the legislative amendment that introduced a 
universal testing requirement was in fact very limited because it only applied to con-
struction type projects (buildings), whereas the infrastructure area was exempted (Dan-
ish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2004). Furthermore, the testing requirement 
only applied to the central government sector, whereas the local municipalities and the 
regions, which in Denmark have the responsibility for central welfare areas including 
primary education, childcare, environmental planning and local roads, were exempted 
from this. 
 
Regulations were thus in reality much vaguer than the pro-PPP policy rhetoric of the 
Action Plan indicated, and the testing requirement was far from universal. Examining 
further the role and competencies of the Danish PPP Competence Unit, we see that con-
trary to countries such as the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands, where PPP units have 
been set up under the Department of Finance, the Danish equivalent was set up in the 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. Being traditionally the little brother to the 
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Danish Ministry of Finance in most public sector reform issues, this institutional an-
chorage meant that the PPP Competence Unit was from the outset limited in its ability 
to coordinate government initiatives. Somewhat paradoxically, in the inter-departmental 
group on PPPs, which was created to coordinate policy initiatives across government 
departments, the Ministry of Finance leads the group. Furthermore, when scrutinizing 
the seven PPP pilot projects, the fact is that only one project has been signed (the Dan-
ish National Archive), whereas four pilot projects have been dismissed and two projects 
are at various stages of planning, but have not proceeded to the procurement phase. A 
close reading of the government’s Action Plan reveals that the seven pilot projects were 
only to be tested for PPP relevance, and that it was not decided how many – if any – of 
the projects would in fact be carried out under a PPP scheme (Danish Government, 
2004). The success rate for the government’s PPP pilot projects has been very low – 
only one of seven projects has been signed – and with a total number of four projects 
signed and two under preparation, the total deal-flow must be characterized as very 
modest. 
 
What this short review of the episode demonstrates is that after the introduction of PPP 
in a Danish context in 1999, the Danish government did in fact take no concrete policy 
or regulatory decisions for the next five years. When, in 2004, the PPP Action Plan was 
introduced, it indicated the Danish government’s serious commitment to a pro-PPP pol-
icy program, but scratching at the surface of this policy rhetoric demonstrates that initia-
tives were in fact less ambitious. Regulatory ambivalence prevailed and competencies 
were split between the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, which has acted as a 
pro-PPP player, and the Ministry of Finance, which is much more skeptical towards 
PPP. This split between the two major departments is reflected in the institutional setup 
of the Danish regime for PPPs, where the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs 
hosts the PPP Competence Unit while the Ministry of Finance presides over the inter-
departmental PPP group. 
Prior and contemporaneous events 
What were the background settings for the introduction of PPP policy and regulation in 
Denmark? To answer this question, prior and contemporaneous events must be carefully 
examined (Barzelay et. al., 2003). Recall from the methodological section that prior and 
contemporaneous events are sources of explanation of the episode. Starting with the 
contemporaneous events, one of the often presented merits of the PPP model is that pri-
vate capital investment in PPP relieves government spending burdens5. But logically, 
this argument would be more valid in contexts where the state of the economy imposes 
serious limits on government spending, whereas strong public finances and budget sur-
pluses on the other hand would make private investment less of an incentive to govern-
ments. 
 
Total government debt and annual government deficit/surplus provide two commonly 
used measures of a country’s economic condition, and are also two central criteria un-
derlying the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary Union6. These two 
fiscal indicators respectively provide a measure of long-term and short-term budget per-
formance, and thus a measure of the Danish government’s capacity for publicly financ-
ing major physical investment projects in the period under examination. Drawing on 
data from the European Commission’s statistical office (Eurostat), it becomes very clear 
that the Danish government’s need to rely on private capital to finance major invest-
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ments has been negligible. In the period from 1999 to 2010, Denmark’s government 
sector produced an average annual surplus of 1.7 percent measured against GDP, com-
pared to an EU average of -2.9 percent in the same period (Eurostat, 2011). Also, Den-
mark’s general government debt was brought down from 58.1 percent in 1999 to 27.5 
percent in 2007 (it thereafter rose to 43.8 percent in 2010 as a result of the global eco-
nomic crisis, which compares to an EU average of 80.0 percent in the same year – see 
appendix 1). 
 
So both short- and long- term fiscal indicators suggest that the private finance element 
of PPP would never have been much of an issue in Denmark, an interpretation that is 
supported in all interviews conducted for the purposes of this article. The Danish gov-
ernment in its Action Plan for PPP put it very clearly by stating that ‘PPP is not an end 
in itself (....) PPP shall only be employed to support effective and good projects, not as a 
means of financial speculation’ (Danish Government, 2004:12). Some major infrastruc-
ture projects that could potentially have been commenced as PPPs, including the Great 
Belt Bridge, the Oresund Bridge, and the Copenhagen Metro, were all financed as state-
owned companies backed by state guarantees. So a number of the prior and contempo-
raneous events were not particularly favorable to a large-scale adoption of the PPP 
model in Denmark. 
 
Another important contemporaneous event that pointed towards more use of PPP in 
Denmark was the change in the political elite, when the social-democratic government 
was replaced in December 2001 by a liberal-conservative government led by Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. A keystone in this third-way inspired policy program 
was reliance on market-based solutions as the means with which to increase the quality 
and value-for-money of public welfare services (Danish Government, 2001, 2003). This 
shift in the political elite established a majority in the Danish Parliament officially in 
favor of contracting out and privatization, but it was the introduction of so-called free 
choice – a right to choose between public and private delivery of welfare services – that 
was most dominant in the policy program (Danish Government, 2001, 2003).  
 
While a change in the political elite brought in a government generally in favor of mar-
ket-based solutions and private involvement in public sector activities, another high 
profile contemporaneous event sent shockwaves through the political establishment. In 
the late 1990s and into the 2000s Denmark witnessed a massive local government scan-
dal in the small municipality of Farum, a suburb of Copenhagen (see also Greve, 2003). 
The mayor, who had for years been praised as an entrepreneur and visionary in invent-
ing market-based solutions, was brought before a court accused of fraud with public 
money and was later imprisoned. Farum had sold a number of public assets as so-called 
sale-and-lease-back arrangements, where private partners buy public assets and deliver 
the service for 20-30 years subject to an annual payment by the municipality. This prac-
tice released substantial amounts of money that the mayor of Farum would invest in 
new projects such as sports facilities, housing, etc.  
 
However, central government regulations require that money released via leasing ar-
rangements is reserved and can only be released gradually. This is to prevent large fluc-
tuations in total public sector spending from year to year due to such leasing arrange-
ments. Though by no means directly related to PPPs, the gigantic public outcry created 
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by the case led to a more general skepticism towards private finance models among 
government regulatory authorities. In the aftermath of the scandal, the regulation of lo-
cal government procurement of PPP projects was amended in a way that made it overtly 
difficult for local municipalities to enter into PPP deals. Although Danish business and 
industry confederations have occasionally voiced criticism of the government’s inaction 
within this policy area, for most of the time these organizations have not been taking a 
role as policy entrepreneurs in the same active way as has been seen in the Irish case 
(see below). Figure 2 summarizes the central events in the development of Denmark’s 
PPP policy and regulation. 
Figure 2: The development of Denmark’s policy and regulation for PPPs 
 
Note: Prior Events (PE), Contemporaneous Events (CE), Events constituting the episode (E), Related 
Events (RE), Later Events (LE). 
CASE 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRELAND’S PPP POLICY AND 
REGULATION 
The Episode 
The official launch of PPPs in Ireland can also be dated back to 1999, when the Irish 
Minister for Finance, Charlie McGreevy, announced eight pilot projects to be com-
menced as PPPs (Irish Government, 1999). These initiatives spanned across different 
sectors, including two school projects, one public transportation scheme, four road pro-
jects, and a waste treatment plant (Reeves, 2003). Institutional support for the Irish gov-
ernment’s PPP program was given via the establishment of the Central PPP Unit in the 
Ministry of Finance, and furthermore, of an Inter-departmental Group on PPPs coordi-
nating policies and regulations amongst government departments and agencies, and an 
Informal Advisory Group for informal talks with business confederations, trade unions, 
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and non-profit organizations (Irish Government, 2001). The government’s institutional 
underpinning of the PPP program was strongly centered around the Ministry of Fi-
nance’s Central PPP Unit which heads both the Inter-departmental Group and the In-
formal Advisory Group on PPPs. Already in 1998, Irish industry was actively pushing 
for a national PPP strategy, and in January 1998 the Irish Business and Employers Con-
federation (IBEC) and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) made a joint submis-
sion to the Irish Government proposing the use of PPPs in the country (IBEC and CIF, 
1998). The aim of the joint submission from IBEC and CIF was to persuade the Irish 
Government of the merits of PPPs, and later the same year it was followed up by an 
additional submission to the government. 
 
The Irish government further endorsed PPPs in the National Development Plan (NDP) 
2000-2006 (Irish Government, 1999). The plan launched investments in PPP projects 
far beyond the level indicated in the initial list of PPP pilot projects. The NDP set a 
minimum €2.35 billion target for PPP activities under the €22.3 billion total investments 
plan (Irish Government, 1999). The Irish government’s commitment to the PPP model 
was thus from the outset backed by earmarked money for projects, and in 2001 the Irish 
Ministry of Finance could report that 134 PPP projects were at various stages of plan-
ning. This number was subsequently lowered when the Central PPP Unit decided only 
to include projects with an estimated capital value of more than €20 million in the ac-
counting. As of April 2009, a total number of 69 PPP projects are reported to be at vari-
ous stages of planning and procurement (Irish Ministry of Finance, 2009). 
 
The Irish government’s approach to PPPs has to a large extent been a gradual effort to 
centralize competencies in a few central government departments. In 2002 the Irish 
government introduced the ‘State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) 
Act 2002’ that laid down a legal framework for state authorities and local authorities to 
enter into PPP deals (Irish Government, 2002a). Besides clarifying the legal basis for 
public partners to enter into PPPs with private partners, the Act removed the ability of 
local government to act independently when entering into PPP deals (Irish Government, 
2002a). A further centralization of the Irish PPP program took place with the establish-
ment of the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) (Irish Government, 
2002b). The NDFA, functioning from 1 January 2003, was to advise state authorities on 
the optimal financing of public investment projects, hereunder PPP projects, in order to 
achieve value-for-money for the public sector. State authorities mentioned in the ‘Na-
tional Development Finance Agency Act 2002’ were hereafter obliged to seek the ad-
vice of the NDFA when planning major public investment projects, but it was still vol-
untary for state authorities to follow the recommendations. 
 
This latitude was removed in 2005 when the NDFA was given the authority to procure 
and enter into PPP contracts on behalf of other state authorities. The NDFA subsequent-
ly hands over the projects to the relevant authority after the PPP contract has been pro-
cured and signed and the project has become operational (e.g. construction is finished) 
(Irish Government, 2007a). The NDFA thus changed its role from advisor to primary 
procurer of Irish PPP projects. Exempt from this Act are the roads and rail sectors as 
well as the local government sectors, where procurement is undertaken by the National 
Roads Authority (NRA), the Railway Procurement Agency (RPA), and the Department 
for Environment, Heritage and Local Government, respectively. 
 
  
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 2, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  15 IPMR
What this short presentation demonstrates is that the Irish PPP program has developed 
quite differently from the Danish case. Eight PPP pilot projects were announced from 
the outset, and earmarked money was dedicated to PPP in the National Development 
Plan 2000-2006. Institutional underpinnings of the PPP program were established at an 
early stage, and centered in the Central PPP Unit under the Ministry of Finance. Busi-
ness federations and trade unions played an active role, and the voices were heard with 
the setup of the Information Advisory Group. We have also seen that the development 
of Ireland’s PPP program has been marked by a gradual move towards more centralized 
competencies and procurement functions, and with clear restrictions on the leverage of 
other authorities to enter into PPP deals. 
Prior and contemporaneous events 
Starting with the prior events, the introduction of PPP in Ireland took place against a 
rather complex politico-economic background. ‘Once the sick man of Europe’ (Reeves, 
2003:163), Ireland entered the 1990s as one of EU’s least affluent economies. Though 
insignificant compared to the total size of national budgets, EU funds provide a signifi-
cant source of capital investment for specific projects in less affluent regions of the EU. 
Throughout the 1990s Ireland relied heavily on EU Structural and Cohesion Funds as an 
additional source of financing the much needed investment in the country’s physical 
infrastructure, which had long suffered from systematic under-investment (Reeves, 
2003). 
 
The Irish government estimates to have received a total of €17 billion from EU funds 
from accession to the EU in 1973 up until 2003 (National Development Plan, 2009), 
and in the ten years from 1989 to 1999 leading up to the episode, €11 billion was trans-
ferred from EU funds, much of which was invested in physical infrastructure. However, 
a decade of economic fortunes throughout the 1990s, and a general redistribution of EU 
funds in the late 1990s as the EU faced the eastern enlargement, significantly reduced 
Ireland’s share of EU funds from 2000 onwards. Accordingly, Ireland’s share of EU 
funds was reduced to approximately €4 billion under the NDP 2000-2006, and further to 
an estimated total of €3 billion under the current NDP 2007-2013 (Irish Government, 
2007b: 16). So by the late 1990s, the Irish government was looking for alternative ways 
of financing investments in a physical infrastructure that, despite recent investment, was 
still considered to be underdeveloped. 
 
One alternative would be to finance projects via the Irish government’s purse – the so-
called Exchequer. Assessing the feasibility of this option by using the same short- and 
long-term fiscal indicators as in the Danish case, we see that the Irish economy also 
experienced better times than the EU-average during this period (although the economic 
crisis has changed this: see Appendix 1). In the period from 1999 to 2007 (latest data 
before the crisis), Ireland’s state sector produced an average annual surplus of 1.7 per-
cent measured against GDP (compared to an average of -2.2 percent in the Euro area). 
Moreover, in the same period, Ireland’s general government debt was brought down 
from 48.5 percent in 1999 to 25.0 percent in 2007, and after that it rose to 96.2 percent 
in 2010 (EU at 80.0 percent in 2010) (Eurostat 2011). So, whereas the falling shares of 
EU-funds in combination with an urgent need to upgrade the country’s physical infra-
structure prepared the ground for private finance investments through PPP projects, Ire-
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land’s government budgets displayed larger surpluses than most other EU countries in 
the years running before the economic crisis. 
 
Nonetheless, the need for further investments in physical infrastructure and public 
buildings was recognized by the Irish government in the National Development Plan 
2000-2006 and 2007-2013 (Irish Government, 1999, 2007b). The high political salience 
towards the issue reflects a more general public dissatisfaction with congestion and the 
state of the infrastructure. But the introduction and development of Ireland’s PPP re-
gime must also be seen against the backdrop of another contemporaneous event, namely 
the active pro-PPP lobbying from Irish business. To understand the impact of this con-
temporaneous event fully, we need to assess Ireland’s Social Partnership Agreements 
which date back to 1987 (Irish Government, 2003). In these agreements, each in place 
for three years, the government, employers, trade unions, farming organizations and the 
non-profit sectors reach a consensus on major political issues for Ireland such as macro-
economic policies, wage settlement, public service quality, workplace relations, etc. 
(Irish Government, 2003). So when in 2001 the Irish government and partners from 
business and labor agreed on a Framework For Public Private Partnerships (Irish Gov-
ernment, 2001), it reaffirmed the Irish social partnership tradition and laid down some 
basic principles – rules of the game – guiding the further conduct of PPP policy and 
regulation in Ireland. Figure 3 summarizes the main events in the development of Ire-
land’s PPP policy and regulation framework. 
Figure 3: The development of Ireland’s policy and regulation for PPPs 
 
Note: Prior Events (PE), Contemporaneous Events (CE), Events constituting the episode (E), Related 
Events (RE), and Later Events (LE). 
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COUPLING THE STREAMS: POLICY WINDOWS, POLICY  
ENTREPRENEURS AND POLICY VETO-PLAYERS  
It became evident in the case study section that the episodes evolved quite differently in 
Denmark and Ireland. Drawing on the multiple streams model, the following pages link 
the episodes with prior and contemporaneous events to examine how and why Denmark 
and Ireland developed such different policies and regulations for PPPs. I distinguish in 
the following between the decisions that led to the introduction of PPPs in Denmark and 
Ireland, and the subsequent decisions that led the two countries to further develop their 
PPP policies and regulation frameworks in different ways. 
Denmark 1999-2003: The policy window remains closed 
The Danish case displays a political stream and a problem stream that for a number of 
reasons were not very favorable to a large scale adoption of PPPs in the late 1990s. Nei-
ther prior nor contemporaneous events made the private finance element of PPP a par-
ticularly attractive argument due to the fact that the Danish government was able to fi-
nance projects out of the public purse – and as a matter of fact did so. Denmark wit-
nessed a continuous and high level of economic growth throughout the period (PE1 and 
CE1 of figure 2), and in contrast to Ireland, EU funds had never been a substantial 
source of finance in the development of the country’s infrastructure. Furthermore, 
Denmark’s physical infrastructure was relatively developed with more need for minor 
and medium-scale renovations and maintenance rather than the erection of a great deal 
of new infrastructure (PE2), and a number of major potential PPP projects in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, such as the Belt Bridges and the Copenhagen Metro, had in fact been 
financed by public money (PE3). So the concept of PPP never really arose on the agen-
da in the problem stream. 
 
The political environment was to some extent reshuffled when the liberal-conservative 
government assumed office in late 2001 with a pro-marketization policy program 
(CE2). In reality, however, the new government eventually came to focus more on tradi-
tional contracting out and free choice than on partnerships. In the policy stream, the 
Ministry of Finance was the single authority considering the potential use of PPPs in 
Denmark, but the interviews carried out for this research demonstrate that the ministry 
was indeed quite skeptical towards the PPP model. So there was no policy entrepreneur 
actively pushing PPP on the decision agenda, and as private investments in physical 
infrastructure never became a serious issue in the problem stream, the three streams 
were never coupled in a sufficient way to facilitate a substantial decision. The Ministry 
of Finance, being traditionally a very strong public sector modernization policy entre-
preneur, chose to introduce the PPP model in one of the last chapters of a budget report 
read by few people outside government. Interestingly, the decision to publish a chapter 
on PPP came completely out of the policy stream with no link to either the problem or 
politics streams. The launch of PPP in 1999 in this sense mostly resembled a symbolic 
decision rather than a substantial one leading to policy and regulation for the use of 
PPPs in Denmark. As we have seen, no concrete initiatives were taken and no projects 
launched at this stage (E1), and the policy window remained closed until early 2004. 
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Denmark 2004-2009: Policy entrepreneurs, veto-players, and a half-open policy 
window 
How, then, can the decisions taken by the Danish government when launching the PPP 
Action Plan in January 2004, be explained? To understand this, we must examine the 
fundamental change of roles that took place in the policy stream in the years between 
1999 and 2004. After 1999, the Ministry of Finance gradually stepped back from the 
PPP agenda whereas the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs stepped up to ac-
tively endorse PPPs in official documents and publications. By this underlying shift of 
roles, the Ministry of Finance’s skepticism towards the long-term financial effects of 
PPPs gradually changed its role into an influential veto-player, whereas the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs turned into an active pro-PPP policy entrepreneur 
(Kingdon, 1995). The changing role of the Ministry of Finance must be seen against the 
background of continued strong government budgets (CE2) and the local government 
scandal over sale and-lease-back arrangements, which resulted in amended regulations 
that considerably narrowed the scope for local governments’ PPP projects (CE3). 
 
Meanwhile, in the political stream, the pro-marketization government was still attempt-
ing to increase the involvement of private business in the public sector. Thus, when the 
PPP Action Plan was published in 2004 and seven pilot projects were announced (E3), 
the political environment was now more favorable to PPPs than it had been in 1999, and 
an underlying shift in the policy stream had taken place, whereby a pro-PPP policy en-
trepreneur materialized. But continuous growth in the short- and long-term fiscal indica-
tors (CE1) still limited the prospects for private finance of public projects, and the prob-
lem stream was thus more or less unchanged. The interviews in fact demonstrate that 
the central ministries in the process leading up to the launch of the PPP Action Plan had 
serious difficulties in identifying relevant PPP projects. So the policy solution was 
clearly there and the political stream provided a supportive environment for PPP initia-
tives, but the problem which the solution could be linked to was still not so obvious. 
 
The result was that the PPP Action Plan was launched with a tentative problem to be 
solved – to see if PPP would deliver value-for-money and innovation in major construc-
tion and infrastructure schemes compared to traditional procurement models (Danish 
Government, 2004). This was illustrated by the fact that the seven PPP pilot projects 
were only to be tested for PPP relevance, in contrast to Ireland, where the government’s 
pilot projects were actually to be commenced as PPPs. As an influential supplement to 
the Ministry of Economic of Business Affairs, which took the role as policy entrepre-
neur in this process, the Ministry of Finance actively engaged as a veto-player attempt-
ing to limit the scope of the PPP initiatives. This evident conflict between the two dom-
inant actors in the policy stream resulted in the formal oversight of the policy and regu-
lation framework being split between the Ministry of Finance, which came to host the 
Interdepartmental Group on PPPs, and the Danish PPP Competence Unit being placed 
under the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (E4). The Competence Unit was 
given responsibility for general competence building, guidance material and disclosure 
of information and guidance of local municipalities engaging with PPPs (E4), but major 
initiatives would have to be coordinated in the Interdepartmental Group, which was 
(and still is) hosted by the Ministry of Finance. When serious regulatory difficulties, 
such as tax and value-added tax for PPP projects emerged, this disagreement among 
central actors seriously hindered an effective resolution of these issues which were only 
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slowly resolved after long negotiations among the various regulators (E5). Indeed, the 
tax and value-added tax issue has never been finally resolved as no generic solution has 
been found, which means that Danish PPP projects still have to be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis before a PPP contract is signed (Petersen, 2010a). 
 
The gap between the positive policy rhetoric of the PPP Action Plan and the subsequent 
reluctance towards solving fundamental regulatory challenges for Danish PPP projects 
can thus largely be interpreted as a result of disagreement among central actors in the 
policy stream, a political stream which favored market-based solutions but was mostly 
occupied with other marketization issues and did not intervene in the specific PPP poli-
cies and regulations, and a problem stream in which a problem that PPPs could be 
linked to was never really identified. This resulted in the development of PPP policy 
and regulation which built on the formulation that PPPs might increase value-for-money 
and innovation in major construction and infrastructure schemes, but few concrete initi-
atives to promote the actual implementation of PPPs in Denmark. The related events in 
Figure 2 clearly mirror this interpretation: the Danish government continues to endorse 
PPPs in various policy documents and speeches, but meanwhile, more than ten years 
after the introduction of PPPs and six years after the PPP Action Plan, only four PPP 
projects have become operational, and a few more have been signed. Let us now turn to 
the Irish case to conduct the same analysis. 
Ireland 1999-2001: Temporal coupling of streams and influential policy 
entrepreneurs 
In Ireland, in the late 1990s, the political stream was significantly more favorable to-
wards the introduction of policy and regulation which supported a large scale use of the 
PPP model. EU funds had constituted a major source of finance for infrastructure pro-
jects (PE1 in figure 3), but a rapid economic development (PE2, CE1) combined with 
the eastern enlargement of the EU, resulted in Ireland facing significantly falling shares 
of EU funds by the late 1990s (PE3). Moreover, in contrast to Denmark where PPPs 
never rose to a high point within the political stream, the political environment was 
fuelled by public dissatisfaction with the major physical infrastructure gap (CE2) which 
had developed due to significant underinvestment during the economic upturn (PE4). 
Thus, in the problem stream, the relatively poor condition of the Irish physical infra-
structure compared to other European countries, which Ireland now matched in terms of 
prosperity and often surpassed in terms of growth rates, increasingly came to be identi-
fied as a major problem for the government (CE2). 
 
Meanwhile, in the policy stream, the major business organizations were actively lobby-
ing for a more active role for private business in addressing the infrastructure gap 
(CE3), and Ireland’s tradition of actively including business and labor organizations in 
major policy programs gave the private policy entrepreneurs an institutionalized plat-
form for direct access to the Irish government, where PPP could be proposed as the pre-
ferred policy solution to Ireland’s infrastructure gap. The successful role of the Irish 
business organizations was manifested when these partners were invited by the Irish 
Government to join the Informal Advisory Group (E2) that was set up to counsel the 
Central PPP Unit and the Inter-departmental Group on PPPs. In direct line with the ac-
tive role of Irish business and the establishment of the Informal Advisory Group, the 
Framework for PPPs was launched in 2001 (E4), basically stating that all major policies 
and regulations were to be discussed among the partners in the group. Thereby, the three 
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streams were coupled at this particular point to open a policy window which resulted in 
the introduction of ambitious PPP policy and regulation to support implementation of 
PPPs in Ireland, and eight concrete pilot projects through which to test the PPP model 
(E1). Moreover, in the National Development Plan 2000-2006, a rolling seven year plan 
for major investments in services and infrastructure, the Irish government earmarked a 
substantial amount of money for PPP projects (E3). 
Ireland 2002-2009: Policy and regulation centralize Ireland’s PPP framework 
In the further development of Ireland’s PPP program, a number of decisions were taken 
to gradually centralize procurement competencies in central government, and particular-
ly in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government. After introducing 
PPP policy and regulation from 1999-2001, concrete PPP projects were now under the 
remit of planning. Moreover, with the Public-Private Partnership Arrangements Act 
(E5), clear legal conditions for public authorities entering into PPP deals were laid out, 
and local government use of the PPP model was made subject to approval from the 
Ministry of Local Government. Regulatory competencies were thus from the very early 
phase centered at the national level, and in 2005 procurement competencies were further 
centralized with the National Development Finance Agency Act (E6), which gave the 
agency the competencies to procure projects on behalf of other departments and agen-
cies (except for roads and railways). Why did this centralization take place? 
 
Part of the explanation can be found in the political stream, where the current state of 
the infrastructure continued to be an issue with high saliency on the political agenda. 
Furthermore, the business organizations which actively pushed for PPPs before 1999 
kept the issue high on the decision agenda by publicly criticizing the government for 
being too passive in the subsequent process. Moreover, as the government initiated the 
planning and procurement of the first PPP pilot projects, it turned out that it would be 
more complex to carry out these projects than first anticipated. One thing was that the 
PPP model was new, which significantly increased the transaction costs and the time 
involved in planning the projects. Another factor was that some of the first pilot projects 
ran into difficulties with the EU’s accounting regulations for PPP projects, which the 
Statistical Office of the European Societies (Eurostat) launched in early 2004 (Eurostat, 
2004). These EU regulations basically required that PPP projects could only be regarded 
as private – and thus taken off the government’s balance sheet – if the majority of risks 
was in fact transferred to the private partner. This was an important issue for the Irish 
government because, as we have seen, PPP was launched in a situation where the gov-
ernment actively tried to replace public investments in physical infrastructure with pri-
vate investments provided via the PPP model. 
 
Thus, as infrastructure deficit continued to be a major issue in the problem stream, the 
Irish government and the Ministry of Finance now actively engaged to open another 
policy window to set a solution in place which could further support Irish PPPs by mak-
ing sure that such projects were removed from government balance sheets. This cou-
pling of the streams to change Ireland’s PPP policy and regulation subsequently hap-
pened twice. The first time was with the 2002 PPP Act, which removed the leverage of 
local authorities in terms of planning and signing concrete PPP projects (E5). By this 
token, the Irish government could control the flow of the deal, ensure that risks were 
sufficiently transferred to make the projects private, and thus safeguard itself against the 
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criticism from business federations that it was doing too little to implement PPPs. The 
second time was in 2005, when a government-wide PPP procurement organization – the 
National Development Finance Agency – was established to take over the planning and 
procurement of most local and central government PPP projects, with a few exceptions 
within roads and railways (Irish Government, 2007a). We thus see that the three streams 
were coupled on several occasions, each time to open a policy window in which further 
PPP initiatives were taken to gradually centralize Ireland’s PPP policy and regulation 
and concrete procurement functions within a few central government departments and 
agencies. 
NATIONAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: THE TWO CASES 
COMPARED 
How, then, do the two cases compare? Denmark and Ireland both officially launched 
PPPs in 1999 and are both subject to a common set of EU regulations on public pro-
curement, risk transfer and on/off-balance sheet accounting. However, despite these and 
other similarities, PPP policy and regulation has developed very differently in the period 
in the two countries. Barzelay’s event centered approach was utilized as a methodologi-
cal heuristic to break down the cases in a number of events arising from the empirical 
analysis of the data collected for the two case studies (Barzelay et al., 2003).  
 
The analysis of the context events (the prior and contemporaneous events) revealed that 
the launch of PPPs in Denmark took place against a combination of strong fiscal indica-
tors, a relatively built-up infrastructure, the existence of a well-tested and successful 
public building-model, and a local government scandal relating to the sale and lease-
back model, which generated a general unease with private finance arrangements within 
the Danish government. In Ireland, the fiscal indicators were also relatively strong, but 
Ireland moreover faced a major infrastructure gap due to years of underinvestment in 
the country’s physical infrastructure. Furthermore, EU funds were declining due to the 
forthcoming enlargement, and public demands for an upgrade of Ireland’s physical in-
frastructure were rapidly increasing. Thus, despite their relative similar points of depar-
ture in terms of fiscal indicators and being late adopters of PPPs, the systematic break-
down of the context events illustrates a number of differences in the background set-
tings against which PPP policy and regulation developed over time in Denmark and 
Ireland (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Overview of context, policy entrepreneurs, and the three streams 
 Denmark Ireland 
Context events 
(prior and con-
tempo-raneous 
events) 
 
Strong short- and long-term fiscal indicators 
Public infrastructure relatively well-
developed: few relevant projects 
An existing well-tested public model: two 
major bridge projects and the Copenhagen 
Metro financed by public bonds and guaran-
tees 
A local government scandal over sale and 
lease-back infuse reluctance among gov-
ernment regulators 
Medium-strong short- and long-term 
fiscal indicators 
Major infrastructure gap as a result of 
years of under-investments 
EU funds a major source of physical 
infrastructure development 
Fiscal transfers from the EU in decline 
because of the EU enlargement 
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Problem stream 1999-2003: No clear problem identified in 
terms of financing Denmark’s physical 
infrastructure development; a well-tested 
model already exists 
2004-2009: Problem still not identified. 
Policy entrepreneurs attempt to redefine the 
problem in terms of improving value-for-
money and innovation of major construction 
and infrastructure projects 
1999-2001: The poor condition of Ire-
land’s infrastructure is increasingly seen 
as a major problem 
2002-2009: Ireland’s infrastructure gap is 
still defined as a major issue. Several of 
the first pilot PPP projects run into prob-
lems with EU regulations regarding the 
on/off-balance sheet issue 
Policy stream 1999-2003: Inspired by the UK PPP/PFI 
experiences the Ministry of Finance official-
ly launches PPPs. No coupling with problem 
or political streams 
2004-2009: A seemingly ambitious PPP 
Action Plan launched, but regulations re-
mained unresolved and few projects were 
implemented 
1999-2001: An ambitious PPP program is 
launched with 8 pilot projects, institu-
tional underpinnings in the Ministry of 
Finance, and money earmarked for PPP 
projects 
2002-2009: Further PPP policy and regu-
lation launched which centralizes policy 
and procurement functions within the 
Ministry of Finance and the Treasury 
Political stream 1999-2003: Low political attention to PPPs. 
The incoming liberal-conservative govern-
ment announces a pro-marketization agenda 
but focuses more on free choice and tradi-
tional contracting out than on PPPs. 
2004-2009: Rising political attention to 
PPPs but still more focus on free choice and 
traditional contracting out 
1999-2001: Combination of context 
variables make the political environment 
favorable to private investments in public 
infrastructure (off-balance sheet) 
2002-2009: Combination of context 
variables still make the political envi-
ronment favorable to PPPs 
Policy window 1999-2003: Policy window remains closed. 
PPPs are only symbolically launched in 
Denmark 
2004-2009: Policy window is semi-open, but 
the three streams are only loosely coupled 
1999-2001: Policy window stays open. 
Several decisions are taken to launch PPP 
policy and regulation and pilot PPP pro-
jects 
2002-2009: Policy window opens occa-
sionally to launch new policy and regula-
tion which centralize Ireland’s PPP pro-
gram 
Policy entrepre-
neurs and policy 
veto-players 
1999-2004: The Ministry of Finance offi-
cially launches PPP but takes no concrete 
action 
2004-2009: The Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs and the PPP Competence 
Unit take over the role as policy entrepre-
neurs. 
Policy veto-players: The Ministry of Finance 
Private business organizations: low activity, 
few initiatives, no formalized institutional 
platform for dialogue with the government 
1999-2001: Ministry of Finance, Central 
PPP Unit and business federations are 
important policy entrepreneurs 
2002-2009: Ministry of Finance, Central 
PPP Unit, National Development Finance 
Agency and roads and rail authorities 
Policy veto-players: No veto-players 
Private business organizations: high 
activity, several submissions, a formal-
ized institutional platform for dialogue 
with the government 
 
Kingdon’s (1995) model provides an analytical framework for the analysis of the 
streams and for examining the role of policy entrepreneurs and policy veto-players 
(Greve and Hodge, 2007) in the development of Ireland and Denmark’s PPP policy and 
regulation. In Denmark, as a result of the context within which PPPs were introduced, 
no clear problem was identified in the problem stream, which PPP as a solution in the 
policy stream could potentially be linked to. Moreover, in Denmark the political atten-
tion to PPPs was generally low, and although the incoming liberal-conservative gov-
ernment announced a focus on marketization and private sector involvement, the focus 
was more on free choice (in the delivery of welfare) and traditional contracting out. Ac-
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cordingly, the streams were not coupled in any sufficient way to open a policy window, 
which resulted in a merely symbolic launch of PPPs in Denmark, with no policy and 
regulation initiatives and no concrete projects announced. This was very different from 
the Irish case, where a clearly identified problem – to remedy Ireland’s major infrastruc-
ture deficit – became a major issue in the problem stream as Ireland saw its share of EU 
funds dropping. In the meantime, the political stream was highly influenced by the pop-
ular dissatisfaction with the state of the infrastructure and strong lobbying from the Irish 
business federations. Accordingly, under the influence of strong policy entrepreneurs 
from within government and the private sector, the three streams were successfully cou-
pled to open a policy window which stayed open for a long time, during which several 
decisions were taken to launch comprehensive PPP policy and regulation and money 
was earmarked for PPP projects. 
 
In reality, the Danish government took no concrete PPP initiatives before 2004, with the 
launch of the PPP Action Plan. The launch was in itself somewhat paradoxical, because 
a problem was still not identified in the problem stream. However, the Ministry of Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit, which in the meantime took 
over the Ministry of Finance’s role as policy entrepreneurs, now attempted to redefine 
the problem as a matter of improving value-for-money and innovation in major public 
construction and infrastructure projects. Not least because of a rising attention to PPPs 
in the political stream, the policy entrepreneurs this time partly succeeded with coupling 
the streams and opening up a policy window in which the PPP Action Plan was 
launched. Underlying the launch of the action plan was a rising conflict of interest be-
tween the two policy entrepreneurs and the former policy entrepreneur, the Ministry of 
Finance, which had changed its role from entrepreneur to policy veto-player. Accord-
ingly, in the aftermath, when the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs and the 
PPP Competence Unit struggled to open yet another policy window in which further 
PPP policies could be launched and Denmark’s unclear PPP regulations could be re-
solved, the Ministry of Finance attempted to dissemble the three streams by arguing that 
Denmark’s strong finances made private finance through PPPs largely redundant. 
 
This was, indeed, very different from the Irish case, where the problem stream was 
fuelled both by the infrastructure gap and by the fact that some of the first pilot PPP 
projects (for example Cork School of Music) ran into serious problems with the EU’s 
regulations of PPPs, most importantly in relation to removing PPPs from government 
balance-sheets, whereby investments made though the PPP route would not affect Gen-
eral Government Debt (Kay and Reeves, 2004). Accordingly, as the political stream 
continued to be supportive to a large-scale adoption of PPPs, a number of further deci-
sions were taken in the subsequent period. In 2002 and again in 2005, new legislation 
was launched, which centralized PPP procurement competencies within the National 
Development Finance Agency under the auspices of the Treasury. By this token, the 
central policy entrepreneurs gained control over PPP policy and regulation as well as 
the concrete procurement and signing of PPP contacts in all sectors except roads and 
railways, where the EU per definition defines that these concession PPP schemes can be 
registered off the balance sheet because the private partner bears the majority of risks 
(Eurostat, 2004; Petersen, 2010b). A successful coupling of the three streams thus pro-
duced a number of decisions which step-by-step embedded Ireland’s PPP program with-
in the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, in contrast to the Danish case, where policy 
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and regulation competencies were split between the Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit serving as policy entrepreneurs, and the Ministry 
of Finance as a strong policy veto-player (Greve and Hodge, 2007). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the past fifteen years, public-private partnerships have become an increasingly 
popular means of organizing major construction and infrastructure projects with refer-
ence to various forms of design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM), design-
build-operate-maintain (DBOM) and design-build-operate (DBO) models. As a result of 
this development, PPPs are now subject to growing attention in academic literature and 
policy practice alike, and ever more public and private resources are now being directed 
to the formation of PPPs. However, there seems to be at least two different interpreta-
tions of this phenomenon. The first, which is often rehearsed in academic literature as 
well as in policy practice, is that PPP is indeed a new form of public governance with 
international application and acceptance. This claim builds, sometimes implicitly but 
often explicitly, on the idea of national convergence – some would say policy learning – 
towards a common and uniform PPP approach, inspired primarily by Anglo-Saxon PPP 
experiences. The second, which is found less frequently in the literature and even more 
seldom in official government documents, is that underneath the reports about PPPs as a 
phenomenon with universal acceptance, we do in fact see a more heterogeneous and 
divergent pattern in the actual attempts being made by governments to form PPPs. 
 
However, few academic studies have focused on how and why national similarities and 
differences have developed over time. This is partly due to the observation made by 
Greve and Hodge that so far “much of the literature has been preoccupied with the per-
formance of PPPs and the legal aspects of PPPs”, whereas less attention has been cen-
tered on the broader policy and regulation aspects of PPPs (Greve and Hodge, 2010: 
158). The other reason is that this field of research, although international in its charac-
ter, has hitherto been dominated by studies operating with single case or single country 
research designs, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. see Greve and Hodge, 2007; Ysa, 
2007). As this research field moves along, there is clearly a need for comparative re-
search designs and more academic reflection about how and why, within a global up-
surge of PPP activity, we see these significant and enduring national differences. 
 
A modest contribution towards this endeavor has been attempted in this article by study-
ing the development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland. Despite their 
similarities in a number of dimensions, within a time-period of just ten years, PPP poli-
cy and regulation developed very differently in these two countries. Whereas PPPs in 
Denmark are subject to a loosely organized institutional framework with a number of 
fundamental policy and regulation issues being either unresolved or not very supportive 
to the uptake of PPPs, Ireland on the other hand now presides over one of the most am-
bitious PPP programs in the world, with major policy, regulation and procurement func-
tions centralized within the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury. The use of Barzelay’s 
event-centered method and Kingdon’s framework for policy analyses allowed me to 
Ole Helby Petersen, PhD, is a Research Fellow at AKF, the Danish Institute of Governmental Re-
search, Copenhagen, Denmark. E-mail: ohp@akf.dk 
  
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 2, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  25 IPMR
analyze how and why these differences developed over time. A major reason, it turned 
out, was the politico-economic background settings against which PPPs were introduced 
in the two countries. Denmark’s strong public finances and well-built physical infra-
structure made private finance through the PPP model largely redundant, whereas Ire-
land by the end of the 1990s faced a major infrastructure gap and declining shares of EU 
funds. Accordingly, whereas the three streams were only loosely coupled in Denmark to 
generate a semi-open policy window, the streams in Ireland were coupled on several 
occasions to create a policy window through which a number of PPP policies and regu-
lations were launched. 
 
While I would not claim generalizability in the findings derived from two case studies 
(Yin, 2003), the research findings have a number of important implications, which 
should be further scrutinized in future research. The first relates to the objectives pur-
sued by governments engaging in PPP activity. This is important because PPPs are of-
ten seen as a tool for the accomplishment of innovation, value-for-money, mutual added 
value and collaborative advantage (Huxham and Vangen, 2004; Klijn and Teisman, 
2005). Based on the comparative analysis, it seems that the primary rationale for form-
ing (or not forming) PPPs was a macro-economic one in Ireland, with a focus on plac-
ing major infrastructure investments off government balance sheets, whereas Denmark’s 
strong public finances and well-built infrastructure made such a maneuver largely re-
dundant. This clearly raises a number of crucial questions relating to why governments 
in reality form PPPs, which should be further investigated in academic literature. A se-
cond implication from the comparative analysis is the importance of policy entrepre-
neurs as well as policy veto-players in decisions about PPPs. Whereas the findings in 
relation to the Irish case are in line with the common interpretation of the role envisaged 
by the policy entrepreneur in coupling the problem, policy and political streams, a main 
finding from the Danish case was that PPP policies and regulations were largely imped-
ed by the predominance of a strong policy veto-player. As research on PPPs moves on, 
with an increased focus also on broader policy and regulation aspects, there is a need to 
further scrutinize the role of policy veto-players, especially in countries which have 
adopted more reluctant PPP approaches. Ideally, such research would contribute to a 
further understanding of why some countries have embraced PPPs, but equally im-
portantly, also why other countries have been much more skeptical. 
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NOTES
                                                 
1 This form of PPP embraces the alphabet soup of design-build-finance-operate-
maintain (DBFOM), design-build-operate (DBO), build-own-operate-transfer 
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(BOOT) and build-operate-transfer (BOT) models, which illustrate the variety of 
models that exist under the partnership umbrella. 
2 It should be noted that Barzelay’s approach has been presented in several papers and 
has been developed over time. Thus, in 2003 (Barzelay et al., 2003), it was merely a 
methodological heuristic for ordering case evidence, whereas in 2006 (Barzelay and 
Gallego, 2006), it was developed into an integrated analytical approach. In this pa-
per, I primarily utilize Barzelay in the former way – as a methodological heuristic for 
ordering the case evidence – whereas Kingdon’s framework (1995) provides the the-
oretical inputs to the analysis. This also means that in this paper I do not make use of 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Levitt and March (1988), which Barzelay and 
Gallego (2006) combine with Kingdon (1995). This choice has been made to limit 
the number of theoretical concepts in the subsequent case analysis, and in line with 
this I therefore do not claim to apply the full version of ‘Institutional Processualism’ 
in this paper, but rather an abridged version of this research program. 
3 Interviews varied from approximately 60 minutes to 90 minutes. 
4 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090 
_33076576and_dad=portaland_schema=PORTAL, searched on 23 March 2009. 
5 When the UK introduced its PFI programme in 1992 the explicit purpose was to at-
tract private capital investment (see also Spackman, 2002). 
6 Though Denmark has so far decided not to join the Euro, it has committed itself to 
these fiscal stability criteria. 
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APPENDIX 1: EUROSTAT GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat ‘Government statistics’ data (searched 18 August 2011): Available from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/data/main_tables 
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APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL SOURCES (THE DANISH CASE) 
Expert interviews 
 Danish PPP Competence Unit, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Tax Authority, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Danish Construction Association, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Danish Ministry of Finance, 8 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Chamber of Commerce, 8 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Local Government Denmark, 10 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Ministry of Transport, 15 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior, 21 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Transport and Logistics Association, 22 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Confederation of Danish Industry, 28 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Policy papers 
 Danish Government (2001). Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse [Growth, welfare - innovation]. 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2002). Vækst med vilje [Dedication to growth]. 
 Danish Goverment, Danish People’s Party, Danish Social-Liberal Party and Christian People’s Party 
(2003). Trafikaftalen af 5. november 2003 [Trafic Agreement of November 5th 2003] 
 Danish Government (2003). Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse II: Supplerende regeringsgrundlag [Growth, wel-
fare – innovation II: Supplementary government platform].  
 Danish Government (2003) Investeringsplanen [Investment Plan] 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). Staten som bygherre [The government as build-
ing manager]. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). Handlingsplan for en mere virksomhedsnær 
offentlig sektor [Action Plan for a business responsive public sector] 
 Danish Government (2004). Handlingsplan for Offentlig-Private Partnerskaber (OPP) [Action Plan for Pub-
lic-Private Partnerships (PPPs)]. 
 Danish Government (2005). Nye mål – regeringsgrundlag VK-regeringen II [New Goals – Government 
Platform II] 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2007). Bedre og billigere byggeri [Better and Cheaper 
Building Activity]. 
Legislation, government orders and other binding decisions  
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (1971). Lov om statens byggevirksomhed m.v. (Stats-
byggeloven).[Law about government building activity]. Act. No. 228, 05/19/1971. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior (2000). Bekendtgørelse om kommunernes låntagning og meddelelse af gar-
antier m.v. (lånebekendtgørelsen) [Government order on loan-taking in the local municipalities and an-
nouncement of garantees etc.]. 
 Danish Ministery of Finance (2002). Cirkulære om udbud og udfordring af statslige drifts- og anlægsop-
gaver [Government circular on procurement and challenge of government service and construction works]. 
Government circular no. 159, 12/17/2002. 
 Danish Competition Authority (2004). Udbudsdirektivet [Public Procurement Directive]. Government order 
no. 937, 09/16/2004. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Bekendtgørelse om anvendelse af offentlig-privat 
partnerskab (OPP), partnering og oplysninger svarende til nøgletal [Government order on public-private 
partnership (PPP), partnering and key indicators]. Government order no. 1394, 12/1/2004. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2005). Lov om ændring af lov om statens byggevirk-
somhed m.v. [Amendment to law about government building activity]. Act. No. 413, 06/01/2005.  
 Danish Ministery of Taxation (2005). Bekendtgørelse af merafgiftsloven (momsloven) [Announcement of 
the Law on Value Added Tax] Government order no. 966, 10/14/2005. 
 Danish Ministery of Taxation (2007). Bekendtgørelse af lov om skattemæssige afskrivninger [in English]. 
Government order no. 1191, 10/11/2007 
 Danish Tax Authority (2007). OPP-projekt - afskrivning på bygninger m.v., ejerskab, frivillig momsregis-
trering [PPP-project – depreciation on buildings etc., ownership, voluntary registration of value-added tax]. 
Binding tax answer SKM2007.234.SR.  
 Danish Tax Authority (2008). OPP-projekt - afskrivning på bygninger m.v., ejerskab, frivillig momsregis-
trering [PPP-project – depreciation on buildings etc., ownership, voluntary registration of value-added tax]. 
Binding tax answer. SKM2008.563.SR. 
Framework contracts and comparator tools 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). OPP relevans vurdering [PPP relevance assessment] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Offentlig Privat Partnerskab. Basiskontrakt. [Public-
private partnership. Basis contract] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Offentlig Privat Partnerskab. Vejledning til basiskon-
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trakt. [Public-private partnerships: Guidance notes to a basis contract]  
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Vejledning. Vurderingsværktøj til Offentlig-Private 
Partnerskaber [Guidance Note: Evaluation tool for Public-Private Partnerships] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Teknisk manual: Vurderingsværktøj til Offentlig-
Private Partnerskaber [Technical Manual: Evaluation tool for Public-Private Partnerships] 
Guidance notes 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2003). Bistand til offentlig-privat-partnerskab på drift og 
vedligehold af bygninger og velfærdsservice [Assistance for public-private-partnership for operation and 
maintenance of buildings and welfare services]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Partnerskaber om kommunale driftsopgaver [Partner-
ships for local government operational tasks]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Vejledning om OPP til bekendtgørelse om OPP, 
partnering og nøgletal [Guidance note about PPP for in relation to government order about PPP, partnering 
and key indicators] 
 Danish Ministery of Finance (2006). Budgetvejledning 2006 [Budget Instruction 2006]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2007). Vejledning til ansøgning om medfinansiering til of-
fentlig-private samarbejdsprojekter 2007 [Guidance note on co-financing of public-private collaborative 
projects] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2007). Fem modeller for offentlig-privat samspil. En guide 
til kommunerne [Five models of public-private collaboration: A guide to the local municipalities] 
 Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (2009). Vejledning om kommunal og regional udbudsstrategi og 
opfølgningsredegørelse [Guidance note on the local and regional government procurement strategy and fol-
low-up review]. 
Reports and major analysis 
 Danish Ministry of Finance (1999). Budgetredegørelse 1999 [Budget Report 1999]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2003). Offentligt-privat samspil om skolebygninger [Public-
private collaboration for school buildings]. 
 KPMG for the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). OPP-Markedet i Danmark 2005-2010 
[The Danish PPP Market 2005-2010]. 
 Birch&Kroghboe, Grant Thornton and Karin Skousbøll (2005). Indsamling og analyse af udenlandske erfa-
ringer med OPP i byomdannelse. Rapport udarbejdet for Socialministeriet og Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen 
maj 2005 [Overview and analysis of international experiences with PPP within urban redevelopment]. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (2008). Rapport om Offentlige-Private-Partnerskaber 
(OPP) og de kommunale låneregler samt visse øvrige spørgsmål i relation til lånebekendtgørelsen [Report 
on Public-Private Partnerships and local government lending regulations and related issues]. 
 Local Government Denmark (2008). Kortlægning af udfordringer vedrørende offentlig-privat partnerskab 
(OPP) [A mapping of challenges in relation to public-private partnership (PPP)].  
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2009). Selvom der er forskel…kan du lære noget af uden-
landske OPS-projekter [Despite the differences…something can be learned from international PPP-
projects]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2009). Plan + Projekt: Offentlig-private samarbejde og 
planlægning [Plan + Project: Public-private collaboration and planning]. 
Press releases, speeches, etc. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2006). Pressemeddelelse: Fælles offentlig-private 
selskaber skal give fornyelse og innovation [Press release: Joint public-private companies should lead to 
renewal and innovation]. 06/02/2006. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Danske kommuner vil gerne offentlig-privat samar-
bejde (OPS) [Danish local municipalities are ready for public-private collaboration] 
 Parliament Committee on Transport (2008). Question to the Transport Minister [Question to the Transport 
Minister]. Nr. 554.  
 Danish Government and Local Government Denmark (2008). Aftale om kommunernes økonomi for 2010 
[Agreement about the local government sector’s economy for 2010]. 
Sources in relation to the schools sector cases 
 PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2008). OPP-forundersøgelse. Ny Høng Skole. April 2008. 
 Rambøl (2005). Trehøje Kommune, Vildbjerg Skole. Beskrivende dokument, Dialogfasen. January 2005.  
 Branchearbejdsmiljørådet Undervisning & Forskning (2009). OPP på Vildbjerg Skole, retrieved 10 June, 
2009, from http://www.godtskolebyggeri.dk/Byggeriets_faser/Udbudsformer/OPP.aspx  
 MT Højgaard (2006). Vildbjerg Skole klar på rekordtid, retrieved 11 April, 2008,from 
http://www.mth.dk/pressemeddelelser/vildbjerg_klar_paa_rekordtid  
 Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen (2009). Håndtering af skat og moms, retrieved 16 December 2009, from 
http://www.ebst.dk/haandtering-af-skat-og-moms  
 DG Market (2005). Request For Proposals DK-Vildbjerg: construction work for school buildings, retrieved 
11 December 2007, from http://www.market.gov.rw/tenders/np-notice.do~843591 
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APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL SOURCES (THE IRISH CASE) 
Expert interviews 
 Irish Department of Finance (Central PPP Policy Unit), 4 November 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish National Roads Authority, 4 November 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Ernst & Young, 6 November 2008, Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
 Irish Department of Education and Science, 7 November 2008, Tullamore, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish National Development Finance Agency, 15 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 16 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish Business Confederation, 16 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Cork Institute of Technology, 18 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
Policy documents and government reports 
 Farrell Grant Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants in association with Chesterton Consulting 
(1998). A Report submitted to the Inter-Departmental Group in relation to Public Private Partnerships. July 
1998 
 Interdepartmental Group on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (2000). Framework for PPP Awareness and 
Training: Background and Explanatory Note 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2001). Framework for Public Private Partnerships.  
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2002). Public Private Partnership National Communications Strategy, 2002 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2003) Policy Framework for Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Ireland. Evolu-
tion of PPP Policy in Ireland. 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2006). Public Private Partnership. Guidelines for the Provision of Infrastructure 
and Capital Investments through Public Private Partnerships: Procedures for the Assessment, Approval, 
Audit and Procurement of Projects 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2007). Guidelines to State authorities regarding the National Development Fi-
nance Agency 
 PPP Policy Unit (2008). PPP Projects Update 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 1. What is a Public Private Partnership? 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 2. What are the potential benefits of Public Private 
Partnerships? 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 3. The Development of Public Private Partnership 
in Ireland  
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 4. The Framework for Public Private Partnership in 
Ireland 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008) Briefing Note Number 5. The Current Status of the PPP Program in Ireland 
(Updated July 2008) 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008) Briefing Note Number 7. PPP and the National Development Plan 2002-
2006 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 8. The National Development Finance Agency  
 Cross-Departmental Team on Infrastructure and PPPs (2002) Fourth Progress Report 
 Department of Education (2005). Section 15 - Guide to the Department's functions.  
 Department of Finance and Price Waterhouse Coopers (2001) Review of PPP structures. 
 Irish Central PPP Unit (2006), Assessment of Projects for Procurement as Public Private Partnership.  
 Irish Government (2001). The Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001 
 Irish Government (2003). Sustaining Progress. Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005.  
 Irish Government (2000). National Development Plan 2000-2006.  
 Irish Government (2007). National Development Plan 2007-2013. 
 Irish Government (2007) National Development Finance Agency. Annual Report 2007 
 Irish Ministry of Finance (2009). PPP Project Tracker.  
 National Development Plan (NDP) (2009). How much money has Ireland received from the Structural 
Funds since joining the E.U.? 
Business and labor union reports and documents  
 Central Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), and the Construction Industry Federation 
(CIF) (1998), Submission to the Irish Government about Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).  
 IBEC (1998). First Report on Public Private Partnerships. 01/01 1998 
 IBEC (1999). Second Report on Public Private Partnerships. 01/04 1999 
 IBEC (1999). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) A Further Submission by IBEC and CIF to Government. 
April 1999. 
 Submission to the Cabinet Comittee on Infrastructure/PPPs on the Guidance Notes (2000). “A Policy 
Framework for Public Private Partnerships” and other Issues. 
 IBEC Press Centre (2003). Survey finds progress on PPP program poor. 02/10 2003 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2005). Guidelines for Unions on consultations with State Agencies and 
Public Authorities in the Republic of Ireland concerning Public Private Partnerships 
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 IBEC (2006). Promoting private sector involvement. In: PFI/PPP 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2006). Investing for All. Submission on the National Development Plan 
2007-2013 
 IBEC Transport (2008): Now is the time for Public-Private Partnerships. In: Public Affairs Ireland. October 
2008 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2006). Investing for All. Submission on the National Development Plan 
2007-2013. 03/14 2006 
 Irish Business News (1999). Immediate action is crucial to improve infrastructure. 04/28 1999 
 Irish Business News (1999). McCreevy urged to target private sector for infrastructural funding. 04/28 1999 
 Hochtief (2008). Public Private Partnership. Concessions business at Hochtief. Position paper  
Legislation 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Service Contracts. S.l. n. 378 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Supply Contracts (Amendments). S.l. n. 379 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Works Contracts (Amendments). S.l. n. 380 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (2002). Public Contract Notices (Standard Forms). S.l. n. 343 of 2002 
 Irish Government (2002). State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act 2002 
 Irish Government (2002). National Development Finance Agency Act 2002 
 Irish Government (2007b). National Development Finance Agency Act 2007 
Press releases, transcripts of speeches and other material 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2001) Speech by Mr. Charlie MaCrevy, T.D., Minister for Finance, Government 
Press Centre at the launch of the Framework for Public Private Partnerships. 11/01 2001 
 Address by Mr. Martin Cullen, T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Finance at the Information 
Seminars on the Framework for Public Private Partnerships. 02/15 2002 
 Address by Mr. Tom Parlon T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Finance. Information Seminars on 
the Framework for Public Private Partnerships. 06/03 2003 
 Speech by Mr. Charlie McCreevy, T.D., Minister for Finance at the launch of the Public Private Partnership 
National Communications Strategy. 04/14 2003 
 Presentation by the Central PPP Unit, Ministery of Finance to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Transport. 
Assessment, Approval, Public Center Benchmark and Procurement of PPPs. 09/23 2003 
 The Examiner (2004). “Funding from the private partners” 
 Statement to the Seanad by Tom Parlon, T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Finance. 11/17 2004 
 The Examiner (2005). “PPPs may resolve infrastructural crux” 
 Address by Mr. Brian Cowen, T.D., Minister for Finance. Second Irish Public Private Partnerships Policy 
Forum, 04/05 2006 
 Department of Education (2005). Schools in Midlands will be the first built in new PPP program 11/22 
2005.  
 Department of Education (2005). Projects under Public Private Partnerships, 09/29 2005 
 Department of Education (2008). Large-Scale Building projects program, 02/01 2008  
Sources in relation to the schools sector cases 
 Buck, B. (2007). An Irish Town Planner’s Blog: 60 Euro music school hits right note. 07/18 2007. Re-
treived February 15, 2010, from http://buckplanning.blogspot.com/2007/07/60m-music-school-hits-right-
note.html  
 BDP. National Marigime College, Cork . Retrieved November 9, 2009, from www.bdp.com/Projects/By-
name/M-O/National-Maritime-College-Cork/. 
 Bovis (2002). Preferred Bidder Selected for Ireland’s New National Maritime College. 04/24 2002. Re-
trieved November 9, 2009, from www.bovis.com/llweb/bll/main.nsf/toprint/news_20020424. 
 City Cork School of Music. Project Description. Retrieved September 8, 2009, from 
www.murrayolaoire.com/education/projects/csm/text.html. 
 Dáil Éireann – Volume 655 – 21 May 2008. Written Answers – Public Private Partnerships. Retrieved Sep-
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